Why Pakistan Does but US Never Considered Pak an Ally ?
The claim that “the US has bullied Pakistan more than any other ally” is based on a false premise and is only partly true. The US did pick on Pakistan the most and hurt it the most, but it would be wrong to call Pakistan a friend. Alliances are always made between people who need each other just as much.
Pakistan – Follower of a Super Power:
A country in the Third World that lives from hand to mouth and crisis to crisis is at best a camp follower of a Super Power. So was Pakistan, even though the US sometimes took care of it when it was in trouble.
Most Pakistanis, who were naïve, thought the US was on their side most of the time. If they felt let down, they only have themselves to blame.
British India was split up at a time
when the Cold War had “solidified” and clear lines had been made between the two rival superpowers. India’s original status in the UN was passed down to it. Afghanistan was the only country that didn’t recognize Pakistan at the UN. Pakistan joined the world body on September 30, 1947.
Soviet Union – British policy:
The Soviet Union saw the British policy of “divide and rule” in the way that India was split up. It had “used its veto power often to keep many countries from joining the UN.”
But because Pakistan was in a good spot and had a lot of people—it was the second-largest Muslim country in the world after Indonesia—and because Stalin didn’t like Gandhism, it quickly accepted Pakistan.
Pakistan made its relationship with Russia an “either-or” affair and ended up “neither” here “nor” there
Pak’s Chance to Align with Soviet Union
India had everything handed down to it, from institutions to facilities to resources. Pakistan, on the other hand, had to start from scratch. Pakistan was scared by the war in Kashmir and India’s move to hold back Rs 55 crore of Pakistan’s Rs 75 crore share of assets until the Kashmir issue was settled.
Why Pakistan needed help on beginning :
One source says that Pakistan’s Foreign Office began with just one typewriter. Before India was split up, there were 16 companies that made weapons, but none of them went into Pakistan. So, Pakistan really needed help on the political, economic, financial, and security levels.
It was so desperate that it chose to join the West. It chose a building in Washington to be its Embassy less than two weeks after it became independent. It made formal ties with the US on October 20, 1947, and with the Soviet Union in December 1949, which was more than two years later.
Role of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru :
On the other hand, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wanted to get close to Moscow, even though Joseph Stalin made it clear that he didn’t like Gandhism, India, or Nehru.
He sent his sister Vijay Lakshmi Pandit to Moscow as the first Indian Ambassador. On August 13, 1947, she was asked to prove who she was.
She “begged Bhai to let her stay in India so she could celebrate Independence Day at home, as she had always wanted to do.” But “she was told that Moscow was important and that the 15th of August was a holiday there.”
In her book, she wrote that she was sad that “Stalin did not meet her or greet her during her more than two-year stay in Moscow.”
“Nehru was not a fan of Stalin.” He thought that Gandhism was a “reactionary movement” that was opposed to communism.
He didn’t back India when it came to Kashmir or Goa. He called Nehru a “running dog of imperialism” in front of everyone. Even though the Indian mission in Moscow tried to get him to come to the Soviet Union, he did not ask him to go there.
President Harry Truman asked Nehru to come to the US in early May 1949. He did this to take advantage of Nehru’s anger. The news “caused a stir in Karachi, because (Prime Minister) Liaquat Ali Khan had not been invited, and in Moscow, where it was seen as more proof of India’s preference for the West.
” Khan, who was travelling abroad at the time, was “offended” that he was “ignored.” He said that Pakistan couldn’t wait any longer. She has to take her friends where she finds them.” When he got to Tehran on May 16, 1949, from Cairo, he asked the Pakistani Ambassador there to get him an invitation to the Soviet Union.
Through the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, the request was sent to Moscow. The official offer, signed by Joseph Stalin, was sent to the Pakistan Embassy in Tehran and the Foreign Office in Karachi on June 4.
Four days later, Pakistan said that Khan and his wife would be going to Moscow soon.
The Western media made a big deal about it being the “first visit of a Commonwealth Head of Government to the Soviet Union” and wondered if it would happen at the same time as Nehru’s trip to the US in October.
But Khan never made it to Moscow, even though Nehru’s visit did happen as planned. Instead, in May 1950, he went to Washington for a 24-day state visit.
Pakistan quickly suggested the trip, and the Soviet Union agreed to it right away. So why didn’t it happen? Political experts have different ideas about why the visit was cancelled without warning, even though it would have “changed the course of Pakistan’s relations with the outside world” and kept the country from being “totally dependent on the US.”
Many people think that the move was a “flirt with Moscow” to get Washington to invite them. But Jamshed Marker, a well-known ambassador who has worked for Pakistan for 42 years, says that Moscow never sent a written offer.
Another Pakistani diplomat, Dr. Samiullah Koreshi, agreed with Marker’s claim when he wrote that “no written invitation to Liaquat was found in the foreign office archives and files.” It was all a verbal request from the Soviet Charge’d Affaires in Tehran.
When Liaquat agreed, they offered him different dates that he couldn’t make, and when he mentioned the last date, they stopped responding.
Abdul Sattar, who was Pakistan’s Foreign Minister after he retired as Foreign Secretary, refers to the visit as “an episode in which the invitation was accepted but not honoured.” He says this to say that he disagrees with both of them. Independent experts are sure that Pakistan got a written offer.
They talk about Khan’s speech in Boston on May 25, 1950, in which he said, “He would be going to Russia; no date has been set, but the invitation is there, and I have accepted it.” On the other hand, people in Pakistan who know a lot about this subject disagree.
Given this, and the fact that Stalin was very clear that he didn’t like Gandhism, India, or Nehru, it seems very unlikely that the immediate verbal offer wasn’t followed up with an official letter.
Liaquat Ali Khan was a moderate socialist who cared about Pakistan’s freedom. He told an interviewer that Pakistan would have “a policy of non-alignment” just three days after it became independent. But he had to deal with strong opponents.
The most important of these people was Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad, who was a strong US ally and saw communism as a “threat.” As a former bureaucrat, he had the backing of the bureaucracy.
He was born and raised in British India and, like the bureaucracy today, was fascinated by Western ideals and ways of life. So, he was “in a position to put pressure on (Prime Minister Khan) and sometimes went against him.” He “strongly opposed” Khan’s plan to go to Moscow and told him to “either run the country or leave.” Khan didn’t have a base of support in Pakistan. He couldn’t afford to upset the government.
Khan also needed the backing of Islamists inside and outside of the Constituent Assembly. He “might have thought” that his trip to godless Moscow would make the far right, which was trying to Islamize Jinnah’s secular Pakistan, fight back.
Also, both the US and UK were against this meeting. Sir Laurence Grafftey-Smith, the British High Commissioner in Karachi, told Foreign Minister Sir Zafarullah Khan that Americans and Britons would be suspicious of his planned trip to Moscow.
These demands got to Liaquat Ali Khan, and he gave in. The offer was a gift from God, but it was thrown away. It came from a country that is close by, is a superpower, and is Pakistan’s sworn enemy’s enemy. India would have lost a lot of ground to Pakistan because of the visit. It would have given Pakistan more power in negotiations with the US.
Political Snub :
Pakistan, on the other hand, made it a “either-or” situation and ended up neither here nor there. Instead, Nehru went for “both,” even though Stalin didn’t like it, and he got “the best of both worlds.” In a strange way, Pakistan not only blew the chance, but also upset Moscow. It was a “political snub” that “deeply hurt the pride” of a Super Power and cost them a lot in the end.
Mushtaq Ahmad said that it was “a big diplomatic mistake.” In short, Pakistan burned its boats and joined the US camp, which turned out to be a dead end it couldn’t get out of, mostly because of two things.